We propose a protocol model which integrates two different ways of analyzing cryptographic protocols: i) analysis w.r.t. an unbounded number of sessions and bounded message size, and ii) analysis w.r.t. an a priori bounded number of sessions but with messages of unbounded size. We show that in this model secrecy is DEXPTIME-complete. This result is obtained by extending the Dolev-Yao intruder to simulate unbounded number of sessions. 
Introduction
Formal analysis has been very successful in finding flaws in published cryptographic protocols [7] . Even fully automatic analysis of such protocols is possible, based on models for which security is decidable or based on approximations (see, e.g., [13, 19, 18, 1, 16] , and [17, 9] for an overview of the different approaches, decidability, and complexity theoretic results).
The decidability of security, or more precisely secrecy, of protocols heavily depends on whether in the analysis an unbounded number of sessions of a protocol is taken into account or only an a priori bounded number. In the former case, secrecy is in general undecidable [1, 13, 14] , with only a few exceptions [13, 11, 2, 8] . One such exception, which is of particular interest in this paper, is that secrecy is DEXPTIME-complete when the message size is bounded and nonces, i.e., newly generated constants, are disallowed [13] . In what follows, let us call this setting the bounded message model. In the latter case, in which the number of sessions is bounded, secrecy is known to be NP-complete [19] , even when there is no bound on the size of messages, complex keys are allowed, i.e., keys that may be complex messages, and messages can be paired to form larger messages. We will refer to this setting as the unbounded message model.
In this paper, we integrate the two models -the bounded and the unbounded message model, and thus, integrate two different approaches for protocol analysis: i) analysis w.r.t. an unbounded number of sessions, which has the advantage that the exact sessions to be analyzed do not need to be provided beforehand, but where a bound on the size of messages is put, and ii) analysis which is rather detailed since the size of messages is not bounded, but where only explicitly given sessions are analyzed. More precisely, we consider a protocol model in which there are two kinds of principals, bounded message and unbounded message principals, or bounded and unbounded principals for short, which only accept messages of bounded size from the environment or messages of unbounded size, respectively. Conversely, in a protocol run, bounded principals may be involved in an unbounded number of sessions while unbounded principals run in at most one session. The communication between the principals is controlled by the standard Dolev-Yao intruder, in particular, the size of the messages the intruder may produce is not bounded. Just as in the bounded and unbounded message model, the principals and the intruder are not allowed to generate nonces. Our model, in what follows referred to as integrated model, comprises both the bounded and the unbounded message model: If in the integrated model the set of bounded principals is empty, then the model coincides with the unbounded message model, and if the set of unbounded principals is empty, then this gives the bounded message model.
The main result shown in this paper is that secrecy in the integrated model is DEXPTIMEcomplete. The main difficulty is to establish the complexity upper bound. The key idea is as follows: To deal with the bounded principals in the integrated model, and thus, the unbounded number of sessions, the bounded principals are turned into intruder rules, and thus, they extend the ability of the intruder to derive new messages. These intruder rules can be applied by the intruder an arbitrary number of times and in this way simulate the unbounded number of sessions. More precisely, we will extend the standard Dolev-Yao intruder by oracle rules, i.e., intruder rules that satisfy certain properties, and show that insecurity w.r.t. a set of unbounded principals and the extended intruder is in NP (given an oracle for applying the oracle rules). -This result is obtained in a similar way as the one in [5] , although the kind of oracle rules considered in [5] is quite different from the rules studied here. -We then turn the bounded principals into oracle rules, show that these rules in fact simulate the bounded principals, and prove that the rules can be applied in exponential time. These steps are non-trivial. From this, we conclude the desired complexity upper bound, i.e., obtain a deterministic exponential time algorithm for deciding secrecy in the integrated model.
As we will see in Section 3, the integrated model is not more powerful than the unbounded message model in the sense that from every protocol in the integrated model one can construct a protocol in the unbounded message model such that one protocol preserves secrecy only if the other one does. Moreover, feeding this constructed protocol into an algorithm for analyzing protocols in the unbounded message model, yields an alternative way of deciding secrecy in the integrated model. However, since the number of (unbounded) principals in the constructed protocol grows exponentially, using the NP-completeness result shown in [19] , this reduction only provides an NEXPTIME decision algorithm. (Note that, together with the main result of this paper and the result shown in [19] , the existence of a polynomial time reduction from the integrated model to the unbounded message model would imply NP=EXPTIME.) More importantly, the constructed protocol is too big for current analysis tools in the unbounded messages model, e.g., [3, 18] , since they can only handle a small number of principals. Conversely, in our decision algorithm, we not only reduce secrecy in the integrated model to secrecy in the unbounded message model but in addition extend the Dolev-Yao intruder to simulate the bounded principals. In this way, we avoid creating new (unbounded) principals. In addition to the improved complexity theoretic result, this approach seems to be much better amenable to practical implementations. In fact, in [6] an implementation is presented for an intruder with capabilities similar to those needed here.
Structure of the paper. In the following section, the protocol and intruder model is presented. Then we state the main result (Section 3). In Section 4, the intruder extended by oracle rules is introduced and it is shown that insecurity is in NP given an oracle for applying oracle rules. We then, Section 5, turn bounded principals into oracle rules, and by applying the result from Section 4 establish the complexity upper bound. We conclude in Section 6.
We refer the reader to our technical report [4] for full proofs and a formal description of the Three-Pass Mutual Authentication ISO Protocol in our model.
Problem Definition
We now provide a formal definition of our protocol and intruder model. We first define terms and messages, then protocols, and finally the intruder and attacks.
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Terms and Messages
Terms are defined according to the following grammar:
where A is a finite set of constants (atomic messages), containing principal names, nonces, keys, and the atomic messages secret and I (the intruder's name); K is a subset of A denoting the set of public and private keys; and V is a finite set of variables. We assume that there is a bijection · −1 on K which maps every public (private) key k to its corresponding private (public) key k −1 . The binary symbol ·, · is called pairing, the binary symbol {·} s · is called symmetric encryption, the binary symbol {·} p · is public key encryption. Note that a symmetric key can be any term and that for public key encryption only atomic keys (namely, public and private keys from K) can be used.
Variables are denoted by x, y, terms are denoted by s, t, u, v, and finite sets of terms are written E, F, ..., and decorations thereof, respectively. We abbreviate E ∪ F by E, F , the union E ∪ {t} by E, t, and E \ {t} by E \ t. The cardinality of a set S is denoted by card(S).
For a term t and a set of terms E, V ar(t) and V ar(E) denote the set of variables occurring in t and E, respectively.
A ground term (also called message) is a term without variables. A (ground) substitution is a mapping from V to the set of (ground) terms. The application of a substitution σ to a term t (a set of terms E) is written tσ (Eσ), and is defined as usual.
The set of subterms of a term t, denoted by Sub(t), is defined as follows:
Let Sub(E) = t∈E Sub(t). We define the size of a term and a set of terms basically as the size of the representation as a dag. That is, the size |t| (|E|) of a term t (a set of terms E) is card(Sub(t)) (card(Sub(E))).
Protocols
We now define principals and protocols. Given a protocol P , in the following we will assume that A is the set of constants occurring in P . We define the size |P | of P as the number of different subterms in F u , F b , and E I plus the size of the representation of D. For instance, D may be a non-negative integer n (encoded in unary) representing the set of all messages of dag size ≤ n. This implies that the dag size of the set of messages represented by D is exponentially bounded in the size |P | of the protocol. We define V ar(P ) to be the set of variables occurring in P .
The idea behind the definition of a protocol is as follows. In an attack on P the intruder may use every principal in F u at most once but the principals in F b maybe used as often as the intruder wishes. In other words, the principals in F b may be involved in an unbounded number of sessions in one attack while the principals in F u only participate in at most one session. It is well-known that deciding the security of a protocol w.r.t. an intruder who may use an unbounded number of sessions and may produce messages of unbounded size is undecidable [13, 2] . For this reason, we will restrict the messages that can be substituted for variables of rules in F b to belong to the finite domain D. However, we put no restrictions on the variables of rules in F u , i.e., these variables can be substituted by messages of unbounded size. We therefore refer to principals in F u as unbounded and to those in F b as bounded. A rule of an unbounded principal is called unbounded and analogously a rule of a bounded principal is bounded. In the following section, attacks are defined formally and the relationship to other models is further discussed. As mentioned, our technical report [4] contains a formal description of a protocol in our protocol model.
The Intruder and Attacks
Our intruder model follows the Dolev-Yao intruder [12] . That is, the intruder has complete control over the network and he can derive new messages from his initial knowledge and the messages received from honest principals during protocol runs. To derive a new message, the intruder can compose and decompose, encrypt and decrypt messages, in case he knows the key. What distinguishes our model from most other models in which security is decidable is that the intruder may use the (bounded) principals as often as he wishes to perform his attack. As mentioned in the introduction, to deal with this, in Section 4 we will extend the intruder by so-called oracle rules.
The intruder derives new messages from a given (finite) set of messages by applying rewrite rules. A rewrite rule (or t-rule) L is of the form M → t where M is a finite set of messages and t is a message. Given a finite set E of messages, the rule L can be applied to E if M ⊆ E. We define the step relation → L induced by L as a binary relation on finite sets of messages. For every finite set of messages E:
With → * L we denote the reflexive and transitive closure of → L . The set of rewrite rules the intruder can use is listed in Table 1 . These rules are called (Dolev-Yao) intruder rules. In the table, a, b denote (arbitrary) messages, K is an element of K, and E is a finite set of messages.
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Decomposition rules
Composition rules The intruder rules are denoted as shown in Table 1 . We consider We further group the intruder rules as follows. In the following, t ranges over all messages.
is not defined, i.e., the head symbol of t is not a pair, then L p1 (t) = ∅; analogously for the other rule sets,
where DY stands for "Dolev and Yao").
The set of messages the intruder can derive from a (finite) set E of messages is:
Before we can define attacks on a protocol P = (F u , F b , E I , D), we need some new notions. Given a partially ordered set F of principal rules with associated ordering <, an execution ordering π for F is a bijective mapping from some subset
The partially ordered set of instantiations of the bounded principals in P is F
We are now prepared to define attacks. In an attack, a principal Π performs his sequence (linear ordering) of principal rules R 1 → S 1 , . . . , R n → S n one after the other. Note that the different rules may share variables which are subsituted by the same message and in this way model the (unbounded) memory of a principal. When in step i a message m is received, then m is matched against R i yielding a matcher σ (if any) with R i σ = m and Π returns S i σ as output. Variables in R i and S i which occurred in a previous step, and thus, have been assigned a message already, are substituted by this message. As mentioned in Section 2.2, the intruder may use an unbounded principal, i.e., a principal in F u , at most once, and he may use every bounded principal, i.e., a principal in F b , as often has he wishes (any time with a possibly different matching). The difference between unbounded and bounded principals is as follows: While an unbounded principal accepts every message as long as it matches the current input pattern R i , a bounded principal expects that the Altogether, the intruder may use every principal in F P once. For a subset of these principals he (nondeterministically) chooses some execution ordering and then tries to produce input messages for the principal rules. These input messages are derived from the intruder's initial knowledge and the output messages produced by executing the principal rules. The aim of the intruder is to derive the message secret. Formally, attacks are defined as follows.
be a protocol and let F P be the partially ordered set induced by P . An L DY -attack (or simply attack) on P is a tuple (π, σ) where π is an execution ordering on F P , of size k, and σ is a ground substitution of the variables occurring in P such that
The decision problem we are interested in is the following set of protocols where we assume the terms occurring in a protocol to be given as dags.
If we restrict the set F b of bounded principals to be the empty set (and in this case we do not need D), then this is the case of protocol analysis w.r.t. a bounded number of sessions and unbounded message size as considered, for instance, in [15, 19, 18] , and called unbounded message model in the introduction. On the other hand, if we restrict F u to be an empty set, then this is basically the case of protocol analysis w.r.t. an unbounded number of sessions but with bounded message size as studied in [13] , and called bounded message model in the introduction. We note, however, that in contrast to [13] , here we allow the intruder to derive messages of arbitrary size, only the size of messages accepted by the (bounded) principals is bounded. Also, we allow complex rather than only atomic keys. Summing up, with the protocol and the intruder model considered here, we integrate the bounded and the unbounded message models.
Main Result
The main result of this paper is:
The problem Insecure is DEXPTIME-complete.
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In [13] , it has been shown that deciding secrecy in the bounded model, i.e., an unbounded number of sessions but bounded messages, is DEXPTIME-complete. Since here we extend this setting, it is not surprising that for Insecure we also obtain DEXPTIME-hardness. In fact, one can use the same reduction, namely a reduction from the recognition problem for Datalog programs [10] , as in [13] .
In [19] , it has been shown that deciding Insecure for protocols P without bounded principals (i.e., F b = ∅) is NP-complete. We can use this result to also obtain an upper bound for Insecure in the general case:
The protocol P can be handled with the algorithm proposed in [19] . However, since P may be of size exponential in the size of P this only shows that Insecure is in NEXPTIME. Thus, the main problem in proving Theorem 1 is to establish the tight upper bound.
The main idea of this proof is as follows: We first extend capabilities of the Dolev-Yao intruder by so-called oracle rules, i.e., intruder rules which satisfy certain conditions. For this extended intruder we show that insecurity for protocols without bounded principals is in NP given an oracle for performing oracle rules (Theorem 2). We then turn the set F D b of instantiated bounded principals into intruder rules and show that these rules are in fact oracle rules. This will yield the claimed exponential time upper bound (Section 5).
In the following section oracle rules are introduced and the NP-decision algorithm is presented.
A General Framework
We now extend the Dolev-Yao intruder by oracle rules, which are intruder rules satisfying certain conditions, and show that insecurity in presence of such an extended intruder for protocols without bounded principals is in NP given a procedure for applying oracle rules. We first introduce oracle rules and then present the NP algorithm.
Extending the Dolev-Yao Intruder by Oracle Rules
In the rest of this paper, let L o denote a (finite or infinite) set of rewrite rules of the form M → t where M is a finite set of messages and t is a message. In Definition 4, we will impose restrictions on this set and then call it the set of oracle rules. The subset of L o consisting of t-rules is denoted by L o (t). The union of the Dolev-Yao intruder rules and the oracle rules is denoted by 
We also need well formed derivations which are derivations where every message generated by an oracle intruder rule is a subterm of the goal or a subterm of a term in the initial set of messages.
We can now define oracle rules. Condition 1. in the following definition requires the existence of well formed derivations. This will allow us to bound the length of derivations and the size of messages needed in derivations. The remaining conditions are later used to bound the size of the substitution σ of an attack. 
Definition 4 Let
For every rule F → t ∈ L o (t) we have |t| ≤ p(|P |) and for all t ∈ F , |t | ≤ p(|P |).
In what follows, we always assume that L o is a set of oracle rules. We call a protocol P of the form (F u , ∅, E I , ∅) restricted. We want to decide the insecurity of a restricted protocol w.r.t. an intruder using L DY O , i.e., the Dolev-Yao intruder rules plus the oracle rules. Formally, the decision problem we are interested in is the following set of restricted protocols P :
InsecureO := {P | there exists an L DY O -attack on the restricted protocol P }
An NP Decision Algorithm
The following theorem is used to prove Theorem 1.
Theorem 2 Let L o be a set of oracle rules. Given a procedure (an oracle) for deciding E → Lo t for every finite set E of messages and message t in constant time, InsecureO can be decided by a nondeterministic polynomial time algorithm.
INRIA Input: restricted protocol P = (F u , ∅, S 0 , ∅) with n = p(|P |), where p(·) is the polynomial associated to the oracle rules, and V = V ar(P ).
1. Guess an execution ordering π for P . Let k be the size of π.
Guess a normalized ground substitution σ such that |σ(x)| ≤ 3n
2 for all x ∈ V .
Test that
5. If each test is successful, then answer "yes", and otherwise, "no". The NP decision procedure is given in Figure 1 . In (1) and (2) of the procedure, an attack (π, σ) is guessed of size polynomially bounded in n. Then, it is checked whether this is in fact an attack. Obviously, the procedure is sound. As for completeness, one needs to show that it suffices to only consider substitutions bounded as done in the procedure. This is proved in Section 4.3, Theorem 3.
To show that the procedure is in fact an NP procedure given a procedure for deciding E → t ∈ L o , we prove that (3) and (4) can be decided by an NP algorithm. Given that |R i σ, S 0 σ, . . . , S i−1 σ| is polynomially bounded in |P | for every i ≤ k (see Corollary 1), it suffices to show that the following problem belongs to NP (given the decision procedure for E → t ∈ ? L o ):
In this problem, E and t are assumed to be represented as dags. The following lemma follows quite easily from the existence of well formed derivations (see [4] for the proof).
Lemma 1 Given a procedure for deciding E → ? t ∈ L o , Derive can be decided in nondeterministic polynomial time.
From Theorem 3 proved in the following section, completeness of the procedure depicted in Figure 1 follows.
Polynomial Bounds on Attacks
To show completeness of the NP decision algorithm depicted in Figure 1 , we need to prove that it suffices to consider substitutions bounded as in the second step of this algorithm. To this end, we consider an attack of minimal size, a so-called normal attack, and show that the size of this attack can be bounded as stated in the algorithm.
Given an attack (π, σ) on a protocol P define |σ| := Σ x∈V ar(P ) |σ(x)|. We say that the attack (π, σ) is normal if |σ| is minimal, i.e., for every attack (π , σ ), |σ| ≤ |σ |. Clearly, if there is an attack, there is a normal attack. Note also that a normal attack is not necessarily uniquely determined.
The next lemma says that normal attacks can always be constructed by linking subterms that are initially occurring in the problem specification or by terms bounded by p(|P |). This will allow us to bound the size of attacks as desired (Theorem 3 and Corollary 1). To state the lemma, we need some notation.
Let
, and k be defined as in Figure 1 . Let SP = Sub({R j |j ∈ {1, . . . , k}} ∪ {S j |j ∈ {0, . . . , k}}). We recall that A ⊆ SP .
Definition 5 Let t and t be two terms and θ a ground substitution. Then, t is a θ-match of t , denoted t θ t , if t is not a variable, and tθ = t .
In [4] , we prove:
Lemma 2 Given a normal attack (π, σ), for all variables x: |σ(x)| ≤ p(|P |) or there exists t ∈ SP such that t σ σ(x).
Using this lemma, it is now easy to bound the size of every σ(x) (see [4] for the proof):
where |P | is the size of P as defined in Section 2.2 and p(·) is the polynomial associated to the set of oracle rules.
From this, we easily obtain: 
Proof of the Complexity Upper Bound
We now show the complexity upper bound claimed in Theorem 1. In what follows, let
The idea of the proof is to turn the partially ordered set F D b of instantiated bounded principals into oracle rules and then use Theorem 2.
The conversion of F D b is carried out in two steps. First, this set is turned into a set of so-called aggregated rules. Then, the rules are turned into oracle rules.
Aggregated Rules
The set F D b consists of a finite set of (instantiated) principals Π. Assume that the linear ordering associated to Π is <, Π = {R 0 → S 0 , . . . , R n−1 → S n−1 }, and R i → S i < R j → S j for every i < j.
INRIA Now, replace every R i → S i in Π by a rewrite rule {R 0 , . . . , R i } → S i . We denote the resulting set by Π agg and call this set the aggregated version of Π. Let F agg denote the set obtained from F D b by replacing every principal by its aggregated version. We call this set the set of aggregated rules induced by P . Define L agg := L DY ∪ F agg , the set of aggregated intruder rules (induced by P ). Note that L agg depends on P . However, for simplicity, we omit P in the notation of this set.
The set of terms the intruder can derive from E using L agg is defined as:
An L agg -attack on P is defined analogously to L DY -attacks.
The following lemma states that there is an L DY -attack on P iff there exists an L aggattack on P when the bounded principals of P are removed. In other words, the bounded principals are moved to the intruder. The proof of this lemma is straightforward.
Lemma 3 There exists an
From this and if F agg were oracle rules (in the sense of Definition 4), Insecure ∈ DEXPTIME would immediately follow from Theorem 2. In general the set F agg does not meet the restrictions on oracle rules. Therefore, we define principal oracle rules meeting the restrictions on oracle rules. In what follows, they are formally defined and it is shown that whether E → t is such a rule can be decided in exponential time. Then, we show that these rules can replace aggregated rules and that they are oracle rules. Together with Theorem 2, this will yield Theorem 1.
Principal Oracle Rules
Let Sub r (F agg ) denote the set of subterms occurring on the right hand-side of rewrite rules in F agg .
Definition 6 A principal oracle rule induced by a protocol P is a rewrite rule of the form E → t where E is some finite set of ground terms with |u| ≤ |P |
2 for every u ∈ E and t ∈ Sub r (F agg ) such that t ∈ d agg (E). Let F p denote the set of principal oracle rules induced by P .
Note that in the above definition |t| ≤ |P | 2 and F agg ⊆ F p . We now show that principal oracle rules can be decided in exponential time.
Proposition 1 For every E and t, it can be decided in exponential time in the dag size of E and P whether E → t ∈ F p .
The key to the proof of this proposition is the following lemma, which is proved in [4] . Intuitively, it states that L agg -derivations are well-formed in the sense that the messages produced in each step of the derivation are subterms of a certain set of messages. Note that L agg -derivations are derivations, as defined in Section 4.1, which use only intruder rules from L agg . In what follows, let H denote the set of subterms of F agg .
Lemma 4
Assume that E → t ∈ F p . Let D denote a derivation from E with goal t over L agg of minimal length. Then, u ∈ Sub(E, t, H) for every message u such that there exists a u-rule in D.
Now to test whether E → t ∈ F p one can iteratively apply rules in L agg to E that create subterms of E, t, H. Let E be the resulting set of terms. Then, Lemma 4 ensures that t ∈ E iff E → t ∈ F p . It is easy to see that E can be computed in time exponential in the size of P . This completes the proof of Proposition 1.
Principal Oracle Rules can Replace Aggregated Rules
Let L p := L DY ∪ F p be the set of principal intruder rules. The set of terms the intruder can derive from E using L p is defined as
Obviously, d agg (E) = d p (E) for every finite set E of messages. As an immediate consequence, we obtain: Together with Lemma 3 this yields:
protocol and let L p be the principal intruder rules induced by P . Then, there exists an L DY -attack on P iff there exists an
L p -attack on (F u , ∅, E I , ∅).
Principal Oracle Rules are Oracle Rules
In what follows, we identify L o with F p , and show that L o is a set of oracle rules. By definition of F p , the last condition on oracle rules (Definition 4, 3.) is met with p(n) = n 2 . The following lemma shows the second condition in the definition of oracle rules.
Lemma 6 If F → Lo(t) F, t and F, t → L d (t) F, t, a, then there exists a derivation
Proof. The proof is obvious. It suffices to observe that a ∈ d p (F ) ∩ Sub r (F agg ), and thus, F → a ∈ F p . The next lemma, shown in [4] , states that if a derivation exists, then also a well formed derivation.
Lemma 7 If t ∈ d p (E), then there exists a well formed derivation with goal t.
The two lemmas imply:
Proposition 3 The set L o of principal oracle rules is a set of oracle rules.
Now, together with Theorem 2 and Proposition 1 this shows the complexity upper bound claimed in Theorem 1.
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Conclusion
We have proposed a protocol model which integrates what we have called the unbounded and the bounded message models, and we have shown that deciding secrecy in our model is EXPTIME-complete. For this purpose we have extended the Dolev-Yao intruder in a general framework by oracle rules and applied this framework to handle an unbounded number of sessions.
In future work, we will investigate in how far this framework can be applied to yield other interesting extensions of the Dolev-Yao intruder. Another question is whether the oracle rules introduced here can be combined with those considered in [5] , with the potential of even more powerful intruders, e.g., those combining unbounded number of sessions with the XOR operator.
A Proof of Lemma 1
The proof is straightforward. 
Note that the set is considered a finite alphabet and that every element of this alphabet can be represented in size linear bounded in |t, E|. Now, using the oracle for deciding L o -steps, it can be decided in polynomial time whether by applying the oracle intruder rules to E according to w the message t is derived. Note that to apply an L o -step creating t one can first guess a subset E of the current set of messages and than check whether E → t ∈ L o .
B Proof of Lemma 2
Before proving the lemma, we need to introduce some notation and state other lemmas.
If t ∈ d DY (E), we denote by D t (E) a well formed derivation from E with goal t (chosen arbitrarily among the possible ones). Note that there always exists such a derivation since the definition of oracle rules ensures that a well formed derivation exists iff a derivation exists.
The proof of the following lemma is obvious.
Lemma 8 For every finite set E of messages, message t, and t-rule L, if E → L E, t, then all proper subterms of t are subterms of E or of size ≤ p(|P |).
two messages γ 1 and γ 2 both derived from E, then it is always possible to avoid decomposing γ with L d in a derivation from E with goal t for some t since such a decomposition would generate a message γ 1 or γ 2 that can be derived from E in another way.
In the proof of the lemma we use the following notation. If 
Proof. We may assume that
can only be applied if γ is already present and then the last rule in D γ cannot be a composition rule generating γ.
Note that D is a derivation with goal t. To construct from D the derivation D , we distinguish two cases: 
Assume that in
with D = D we are done. Otherwise, let F 1 be the set of messages obtained by applying D γ . Now, Definition 4, (2) implies that every step in D of the form
can be replaced by a derivation from F 1 , F 2 with goal β that does not contain rules from L d (γ). Replacing steps in this way and then removing redundant steps yields the derivation D we are looking for.
The subsequent lemma will allow us to replace certain subterms occurring in a substitution of an attack by smaller terms.
Lemma 11 Let E and F be sets of messages with
Proof. By Lemma 9, there exists a well formed derivation D s from E with goal s such that the last step is a composition rule. By Lemma 10, there exists a derivation 
We can now show Lemma 2.
Assume that (*): |σ(x)| > p(|P |) and for every t, t σ σ(x) implies t ∈ SP . We will lead this to a contradiction. Since A ⊆ SP , we have σ(x) ∈ Atoms. There exists j such that σ(x) ∈ Sub(R j σ) since there exists R j with x ∈ V ar(R j ). Let N x be minimal among the possible j.
Note that σ(x) ∈ Sub(S 0 ) since otherwise σ(x) ∈ SP , and thus, j > 0. Because of ( * ) there must exist y ∈ V ar(S j ) with σ(x) ∈ Sub(σ(y)). By definition of principals, there exists an R j with j ≤ j and y ∈ V ar(R j ). But then, σ(x) ∈ Sub(R j σ) in contradiction to the minimality of
, and there exists a derivation of σ(x) from E 0 such that the last step is a composition rule.
Let us define the replacement δ = [σ(x) ← I]. Since (π, σ) is an attack, for all j, we have:
We distinguish two cases:
Assume j ≥ N x . Now, with E = E 0 and F = S Nx σ, . . . , S j−1 σ, Lemma 11 implies
in both cases. Now, since for all t with t σ σ(x) it follows t ∈ SP , we can conclude:
where σ = σδ. Hence, (π, σ ) is an attack. But since σ is obtained from σ by replacing σ(x) by a strictly smaller message, namely I, we obtain |σ | < |σ|, a contradiction to the assumption that (π, σ) is a normal attack.
C Proof of Theorem 3
Let S = {σ(x) | x ∈ V ar} and S = {σ(x) | x ∈ V ar and |σ(x)| ≤ p(|P |)}. We will bound |S|. Given a set of messages Z, let
We note that Z ⊆ Z implies V Z ⊆ V Z and P Z ⊆ P Z , and that V S = ∅.
Proof of the claim. We construct a sequence of sets 
which concludes the proof of the claim. At step i, one of two cases may arise when removing
Since |v| > p(|P |), by Lemma 2 there exists t ∈SP such that t σ v. Then,
since σ(y) ∈ Z i \ v = Z i+1 for every y ∈ V ar(t) and P Zi ∪{t} ⊆ P Zi+1 . This proves the claim. ∈ H. Thus, v was not created by a rule in F agg . By the proof for L c it was also not created by a rule in L c , and because of ( * * ) it was also not created by a rule in L d . Thus, v ∈ Sub(E), and therefore, u ∈ Sub(E), which is a contradiction.
E Proof of Lemma 7
Let D be a derivation of minimal length from E with goal t. Because of Lemma 6 we may assume (*):
for some s and s . We need to prove that s ∈ Sub(E). We prove that s ∈ Sub(E), which implies s ∈ Sub(E) by the definition of decomposition rules. If s ∈ E, nothing is to show. Otherwise, s was created before L was applied. This term cannot be created by some rule in L c (s ) since then L would be redundant in contradiction to the minimality of D. Furthermore, by assumption (*), s was not created by L o (s ). Thus, s was created by a rule in L d (s ). Now, we can proceed with s instead of s and iterating this argument it follows s ∈ Sub(E). Now, assume that L ∈ D ∩ L c (s). We need to show s ∈ Sub(E, t). We first observe: 
F Example
As an example of a protocol we consider the Three-Pass Mutual Authentication ISO Protocol as given in [7] . Informally, the protocol is described in the usual Alice and Bob notation in Figure 2 . In this protocol, K ab is a symmetric key. On receiving message 2., B checks that Rb and B are present, and on receiving message 3., A checks that Ra and Rb are the same as in messages 2. and 1., respectively.
